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Abstract
This paper presents a two-sector Kalecki–Kaldor model of income distribution, technical
change, and economic growth. The model is Kaleckian in the sense that it incorporates
mark-up pricing, investment independent of saving, and excess capacity. It is also Kaldorian
in that labour productivity growth is led by Kaldor’s technical progress function. In other
words, productivity growth is endogenously realised through the technology embodied in
new capital stock, which differentiates our model from previous two-sector models. Our
extension drastically changes the standard Kaleckian implications. We find that although
the economic activity levels in the short run are led by the demand and income distribution
parameters, economic growth in the long run is realised by supply-side (i.e. technical change
and the associated productivity and wage growth) parameters. The important implication of
our findings is that a two-sector economy faces a trade-off between a high economic growth
rate and the local stability of the steady state.
Keywords: Two-sector model, Economic growth, Endogenous productivity growth, Techni-
cal change, Income distribution
JEL Classification: D33, E12, O41
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1 Introduction
This study analyses the short- and long-run macroeconomic performance of income distribution,
technical change, and economic growth in a two-sector economy in which sector 1 is a capital
goods production industry and sector 2 is a consumption goods production industry. The model
is built from a Kaleckian perspective of income distribution and economic growth. It also explic-
itly incorporates technical progress and the associated productivity growth from the Kaldorian
perspective.
Kaleckian models have analysed the relationship between functional income distribution and
economic growth. The analysis of the existence and stability of wage-led demand (WLD) and
profit-led demand (PLD) regimes has attracted much research interest (Lavoie and Stockhammer
(2013); Setterfield (2016); Nishi and Stockhammer (2020a,b)). Since effective demand is the
driving force of the economic growth in these models, they are characterised as demand-led
growth models (Blecker and Setterfield (2019)). Over time, demand-led growth models have
been extended in various ways, with endogenous change in labour productivity, in particular,
being recently introduced (Storm and Naastepad (2017); Tavani and Zamparelli (2017); Fazzari
et al. (2020)). As these models are mostly built in an aggregate style, as shown by Tavani and
Zamparelli (2017), they do not consider the dynamics of production and expenditure specific to
each industry or the associated feedback between sectors.
Indeed, recent empirical studies have found that macroeconomic performance measures such
as income distribution, economic growth, and productivity dynamics are heterogeneously af-
fected by different industries. For instance, De Serres et al. (2002) show that the decline in the
aggregate wage share over much of the 1980s and 1990s in European countries and the United
States partly reflects changes in the sectoral composition of the economy. Timmer et al. (2013)
empirically find that the industry sources of Europe’s economic growth slowdown differ from
those of the United States. In analysing Baumol’s growth disease, Nishi (2019) reveals that man-
ufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors in Japan present different productivity growth rates.
These empirical studies highlight that the roles of different industries are crucial to understand-
ing long-run macroeconomic performance. However, an aggregate macroeconomic model cannot
analyse such heterogeneous industrial dynamics.
To shed light on some of these dynamics, a disaggregated approach has gradually developed
in Kaleckian studies and the two-sector model is the most dominant platform. Recent studies
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featuring Kaleckian (or post-Keynesian) two-sector models have tended to follow three threads:
(i) the effect of income distribution and savings (Fujita (2019a,b); Beqiraj et al. (2019)), (ii)
the possibility of business cycles (Murakami (2017); Murakami and Zimka (2020)), and (iii)
endogenous change in productivity growth (Bassi and Lang (2016); Nishi (2020)).
First, Fujita (2019a,b) finds the existence of a hybrid demand regime in different sectors.
A hybrid demand regime means that the demand regime (i.e. WLD/PLD) differs between two
sectors. Beqiraj et al. (2019) show a structural change towards tertiarisation advances through
changes in consumers’ preference or the saving rate. These phenomena are particular to the mul-
tisector model, but none of these models suppose an endogenous change in productivity growth.
Second, Murakami (2017) finds the existence of limit cycles, and Murakami and Zimka (2020)
further identify their stability in a two-sector model. Interestingly, they reveal that investment
goods production leads consumption goods production in business cycles. However, income dis-
tribution and technical change are excluded from these models. Third, Bassi and Lang (2016)
present an agent-based model with endogenous productivity growth to explain hysteretic output
dynamics. Nishi (2020) formalises endogenous labour productivity changes and also finds the
existence of a hybrid demand regime. These studies are important because two-sector models
have paid less attention to labour productivity dynamics. Nonetheless, Bassi and Lang (2016) a
priori suppose a WLD regime only, whereas the mechanism of the technical change is ambiguous
in Nishi (2020).
The causes and effects of income distribution, labour productivity dynamics, and growth cy-
cles have thus been important research topics in the two-sector Kaleckian (or post-Keynesian)
studies. However, previous models have focused on only one or two of these aspects despite
increasing research interest and the empirical relevance of the multisectoral perspective. Conse-
quently, the linkage and feedback mechanism between income distribution, labour productivity
dynamics, and economic growth have not been comprehensively understood in Kaleckian two-
sector models.
How do income distribution, technical change, and effective demand dynamics interact to
generate the sectoral and macroeconomic outcomes in a multisector framework? The present
study contributes to answering this fundamental question by comprehensively analysing the link-
age or feedback mechanism among them. Essentially, we adopt a Kaleckian approach, as we
set an investment function independent of savings and mark-up pricing in oligopolistic goods
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markets characterised by excess capacity. Moreover, the presented model is also Kaldorian in
the sense that labour productivity growth is endogenously determined by the technical change
embodied in capital accumulation. Hence, we call our approach a two-sector Kalecki–Kaldor
(TKK) approach.1
Following previous studies, we examine the short- and long-run dynamics of a two-sector
economy. In the short run, a change in the exogenous variables is accommodated by the variation
in the capacity utilisation rates. In the long run, while the capacity utilisation rates continuously
vary, the dynamics of capital accumulation and technical change also proceed.
Our model departs from those of previous studies in two ways. First, we introduce technical
change and the associated productivity and wage growth dynamics as the supply-side effects.
Following Foley et al. (2019) Chapter 3, the production technique in a sector is defined by its
labour productivity and the output–capital ratio, and the pattern of technical change is identified
by its growth rates. This extension, thus, differentiates our study from the first and second threads
of previous studies discussed above, which do not incorporate these effects.2 Second, unlike
Bassi and Lang (2016), we do not suppose an a priori WLD regime only, and differently from
Nishi (2020), technical change is explicitly formalised through the Kaldorian technical progress
mechanism as a long-run phenomenon.3 By doing so, this study comprehensively addresses the
1This study is a theoretical analysis, but the approach also has empirical relevance. For instance, the Kaleckian
model has been applied to estimate the relationships among income distribution, aggregate demand, and economic
growth in many countries, and WLD and PLD regimes have been identified (Lavoie and Stockhammer (2013) and
Stockhammer (2017)). Meanwhile, although Kaldor (1957)’s model is dated, the empirical validity of its technical
progress function is still econometrically confirmed. Fabrizio et al. (2020) empirically show that both the output
growth rate and the process of capital intensification exert positive effects on labour productivity growth. Marquetti
et al. (2020) also confirm that higher capital accumulation is associated with a higher and positive labour productivity
growth rate.
2This study regards technical change and the associated productivity and wage growth as a supply-side effect be-
cause they principally determine how efficiently an economy can produce goods and generate income using different
production techniques. This effect is also affected by the changes in effective demand dynamics in the following
dynamic modelling.
3Nishi (2020) is the closest to the present study, but it has two deficiencies in reality. The first is that the
endogenous change in productivity growth proceeds before capital accumulation in his model, which does not fit
with the historical fact that technical change is embodied in new capital stock (Dume´nil and Le´vy (2010); Campbell
and Tavani (2019)). The second is that capitalists do not consume at all, saving all that they earn. This behaviour
is probably assumed for simplicity to analyse the model. However, it means that capitalists cannot survive because
they do not consume, which is unrealistic. Our TKK approach also addresses these deficiencies.
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remaining gaps in the body of knowledge on this topic.
Our TKK approach offers similar short-run implications for standard Kaleckian models, but
this drastically changes in the long run. First, the two-sector economy’s activity levels in the short
run are led by demand and income distribution. The hybrid demand regime can also be observed
in our model, where the two sectors respond differently to the same distribution shock. Second,
in the long run, the growth rates of output and labour productivity are exclusively realised by the
supply-side effects. These effects also determine the persistent disparity in the growth rates of
productivity and wages between the two sectors. Lastly, the so-called paradoxes of cost and thrift
do not work in this period.4 Thus, the model is Kaleckian in the short run but Kaldorian in the
long run. In summary, the novelty of the present study is that these long-run implications have
not been revealed by previous two-sector models.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the basic framework
of our model. Section 3 presents a short-run analysis that considers the extent to which changes in
income distribution and the saving rate affect the capacity utilisation rates. Section 4 investigates
the long-run dynamics under which capital accumulation and the associated change in labour
productivity growth are also realised. Identifying the stability conditions for the long-run steady
state, it also sheds light on how macroeconomic performance differs from industrial performance
with regard to changes in the relevant parameters. Finally, Section 5 concludes. The Appendix
provides the mathematical explanations for the comparative statics analysis.
2 Model
This section describes the TKK model, which consists of the dynamics of the capacity utilisation
rates, the relative ratio of the unit labour cost, and capital stock between the two sectors. We
use the following notations to set up the model: Xit: output level, Dit: effective demand, Lit:
labour employment, Kit: capital stock, Cit: consumption, Iit: investment, wit: nominal wage
rate, rit: profit rate, pit: price level, µit: mark-up rate, ait: labour productivity level, git: capital
accumulation rate, mit: profit share, uit: capacity utilisation rate, kt: relative capital ratio (hereafter
4The paradox of costs means that lowering the wage share (or real wages) leads to lower output and higher
employment. The paradox of thrift implies that a rise in the saving rate actually lowers aggregate demand. Both
paradoxes arise because of a fall in consumption demand, causing the profit rate or output growth rate to decline
consequently.
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capital ratio), zit: relative unit labour cost ratio (hereafter unit cost ratio), i: sector i = 1, 2, and
t: time. The variables with t change over time, but we do not explicitly denote it below for
parsimony.
A closed economy with no government sector is supposed. It is composed of two sectors: sec-
tor 1 produces capital goods and sector 2 produces consumption goods. Each sector specialises
in its original goods using capital stock and labour. In each sector, workers supply labour to firms
managed by capitalists. The former receive a wage bill and the latter receive a profit income. The
model does not suppose the depreciation of capital stock or intermediate goods for simplicity.
Firms in the economy operate with the following Leontief-type fixed coefficient production
function using capital stock and labour:
X1 = min(u1K1, a1L1), (1)
X2 = min(u2K2, a2L2). (2)
We suppose that the potential output–capital ratio is constant and normalised to unity. Then, the
output–capital ratio can be considered to be the capacity utilisation rate (i.e. ui = Xi/Ki).5 When
this rate is constant at a steady state in the long run, the growth rates of capital stock and actual
and potential output levels are the same.
The income generated by production and selling is distributed to the workers and capitalists
in each sector:
p1X1 = w1L1 + p1r1K1, (3)
p2X2 = w2L2 + p1r2K2, (4)
where piXi is total income, wiLi is the wage bill, and p1riKi is the total profit in sector i.
Each sector is under monopolistic competition, and the capitalists set the price level based on
mark-up pricing:
p1 = (1 + µ1)w1
a1
, (5)
p2 = (1 + µ2)w2
a2
. (6)
5The output–capital ratio can be decomposed into ui = Xi
¯Xi
·
¯Xi
Ki , where ¯Xi denotes the potential output of sector i.
As the capital stock to potential output ratio is set to unity, the movement of the output–capital ratio is proportional
to the ratio of actual output to potential output. Accordingly, the output–capital ratio is a proxy of the capacity
utilisation rate.
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The mark-up rate µi is set over the unit labour cost. The present model assumes that the nominal
wage rates are different and considers an endogenous change in wage growth at a different pace
in the long run.6
Based on eqs. (3)–(6), the profit share of each sector is
m1 = 1 −
w1L1
p1X1
=
µ1
1 + µ1
, (7)
m2 = 1 −
w2L2
p2X2
=
µ2
1 + µ2
. (8)
Thus, there is a one-to-one relationship between the profit share and mark-up rate. A rise in the
latter obviously increases the former. If the mark-up rate is constant, we can regard the profit
share as an exogenous variable. Below, we employ the profit share as such and clarify its impact
on the capacity utilisation rates and output growth.
Replacing the mark-up rate with the profit share in eqs. (5) and (6), we define the relative
price ratio between the two sectors as follows:
p ≡
p1
p2
=
(
1 − m2
1 − m1
)
z, (9)
where z ≡ w1a2
w2a1
is the unit cost ratio, which is supposed to be constant in the short run.
Next, we define demand for (expenditure on) the goods produced in each industry. Demand
for the capital goods produced in sector 1 consists of the expenditure by firms in both sectors. In
the nominal term, their demand is
p1D1 = p1(I1 + I2). (10)
Then, we introduce a linearised version of the investment function a` la Bhaduri and Marglin
(1990) that also determines the capital accumulation rate in the long run:
I1
K1
= g1 = α1 + β1m1 + γ1u1, (11)
I2
K2
= g2 = α2 + β2m2 + γ2u2, (12)
where αi is a positive constant term and βi and γi are positive coefficients that measure the profit
effect and accelerator effect of the investment demand, respectively. In a multisector model,
6Sraffian questions Kaleckian that a change in the mark-up rate in one sector affects the mark-up rate and price
level in another sector (Steedman (1992)). If one introduces intermediate goods into a two-sector model, this may
happen as Fujita (2019a,b) shows. However, this study exclusively examines the interactions of income distribution,
technical change, and effective demand dynamics of two sectors, without using Sraffian price determination.
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these parameters may differ across sectors, meaning that the effect of each variable on sectoral
investment is heterogeneous.
Substituting eqs. (11) and (12) into (10) and representing demand for capital goods by the
capacity utilisation rate, we obtain the following equation:
D1
K1
= α1 + β1m1 + γ1u1 + (α2 + β2m2 + γ2u2)k, (13)
where k ≡ K2
K1
is the capital ratio between the two sectors, which is supposed to be constant in
the short run.
Demand for the consumption goods produced in sector 2 consists of the expenditure by the
workers and capitalists in both sectors. Assuming a classical consumption hypothesis, the work-
ers spend all their wage income, whereas the capitalists spend a proportion of their profit income.
We simply assume that the saving rate of the capitalists is unique across the sectors, which is
denoted by s ∈ (0, 1). Demand for consumption goods presented in the nominal term is
p2D2 = p2(C1 +C2) = (w1L1 + w2L2) + (1 − s)(p1r1K1 + p1r2K2), (14)
where the first and second terms on the right-hand side represent consumption by all the workers
and that by all the capitalists, respectively. Normalising with sector 2’s nominal capital stock,
demand for consumption goods is written as follows:
D2
K2
=
z(1 − sm1)(1 − m2)u1
k(1 − m1) + (1 − sm2)u2. (15)
The propensity to consume is higher for the workers than for the capitalists. Then, a rise in the
saving rate by the capitalists (s) reduces demand for consumption goods.
Further, a rise in the profit share in sector 1 (m1) increases demand for consumption goods
for the following reasons. First, it decreases demand for consumption goods through the redis-
tribution of income from the workers to the capitalists. Second, by contrast, a rise in sector 1’s
profit share lowers the price of consumption goods towards that of capital goods (i.e. a higher p),
increasing the purchasing power of both the capitalists and the workers in sector 1 for consump-
tion goods. If the saving rate of the capitalists is below unity, the second effect works stronger
than the first effect.7
7In eq. (15), a rise in the profit share reduces consumption demand by −sp u1k , which is the first effect. It
simultaneously increases that demand by (1 − sm1) u1k ∂p∂m1 through the change in the relative price ratio, which is the
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Moreover, a rise in sector 2’s profit share (m2) decreases demand for consumption goods
because it redistributes income from the workers to the capitalists. Additionally, it raises the
price of consumption goods towards that of capital goods (i.e. a lower p), also decreasing the
purchasing power of both the capitalists and the workers in sector 1 for consumption goods.
Finally, a change in the unit cost ratio (z) alters the relative price ratio, affecting the purchasing
power of the workers and capitalists in sector 1. If the unit labour cost falls faster in sector 2 than
in sector 1, the unit cost ratio rises. Then, sector 2’s price level becomes cheaper (i.e. a higher
p), increasing the purchasing power of the workers and capitalists in sector 1 for consumption
goods.
3 Analysis of the short-run dynamics
3.1 Dynamic system, steady state, and stability
In the short run, the quantity adjustment is dominant given the technique of production in a sector.
In other words, the state variables are the sectoral capacity utilisation rates ui given the capital
ratio k and unit cost ratio z.8
The dynamic system consists of the quantity adjustment process for excess demand or supply
for capital and consumption goods:
u˙1 = φ1
(
D1
K1
− u1
)
= φ1(g1 + g2k − u1), (16)
u˙2 = φ2
(
D2
K2
− u2
)
= φ2
(
z(1 − sm1)(1 − m2)u1
k(1 − m1) − sm2u2
)
, (17)
where the dot over the variable represents its time derivative (i.e. u˙i ≡ dui/dt). φ1 and φ2
are positive parameters representing the adjustment speed of the quantity in sectors 1 and 2,
respectively, and g1 and g2 follow eqs. (11) and (12), respectively.
second effect. Therefore, the total effect is
∂D2/k2
∂m1
=
(1 − s)u1 p
(1 − m1)k ,
which is positive if the saving rate of the capitalists is below unity.
8We conventionally divide the entire period into the short and long run, but actually the long-run trend is only
a slowly changing component of a chain of short-run situations, as Kalecki (1971) states (p. 165). Put differently,
in this time process, the capacity utilisation rates are fast variables, which vary faster than the slow ones. The slow
variables are capital stock and labour productivity, which are fixed in the short run.
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The steady state is given by the capacity utilisation rates (u∗1, u∗2) satisfying u˙1 = u˙2 = 0. We
can find a unique value of the short-run steady state as follows:
u∗1 =
(1 − m1) m2s(G1 +G2k)
sm2 (1 − γ1) (1 − m1) − γ2(1 − m2)(1 − sm1)z , (18)
u∗2 =
(1 − m2) (1 − sm1) z(G1 +G2k)
k[sm2 (1 − γ1) (1 − m1) − γ2(1 − m2)(1 − sm1)z] , (19)
where we denote G1 ≡ α1+β1m1 > 0 and G2 ≡ α2+β2m2 > 0. As we show below, the steady-state
values of the capacity utilisation rates are positive if their local stability conditions are ensured.
We then investigate the local asymptotic stability of the steady state by linearising the system
of differential eqs. (16) and (17). Let J∗ denote the Jacobian matrix for the short-run dynamic
system; its elements are given as follows:
j11 ≡ ∂u˙1
∂u1
= −φ1(1 − γ1), (20)
j12 ≡ ∂u˙1
∂u2
= φ1γ2k, (21)
j21 ≡ ∂u˙2
∂u1
=
φ2(1 − sm1)(1 − m2)z
k(1 − m1) , (22)
j22 ≡ ∂u˙2
∂u2
= −φ2sm2, (23)
where all the elements are evaluated at the steady state. The necessary and sufficient conditions
for the stability of the short-run steady state are
Tr J∗ = −φ1(1 − γ1) − sm2φ2 < 0, (24)
det J∗ = φ1φ2
1 − m1
(sm2(1 − γ1)(1 − m1) − γ2(1 − m2)(1 − sm1)z) > 0, (25)
where Tr J∗ and det J∗ are the trace and determinant of the Jacobian matrix, respectively.
The necessary and sufficient conditions are satisfied if 1 > γ1 and sm2 (1 − γ1) (1 − m1) >
γ2(1−m2)(1− sm1)z. The economic meaning of these conditions is as follows. The first inequality
represents the Keynesian stability condition for sector 1’s quantity adjustment, which ensures a
self-stable capacity utilisation rate in this sector. The second inequality excludes the extreme
case in which the positive feedback between the capacity utilisation rates of the two sectors is
very strong. If this is the case, the short-run steady-state values of the capacity utilisation rates
are also positive, as in eqs. (18) and (19).
Therefore, the short-run stability conditions can be summarised in the following proposition.
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Proposition 1. The short-run steady state is locally and asymptotically stable if the Keynesian
stability condition for sector 1’s quantity adjustment is ensured and if the positive feedback of the
capacity utilisation rates between the two sectors is weak.
In the following, we advance our argument as Proposition 1 holds.
3.2 Comparative statics analysis
We graphically present the impacts of a change in the income distribution and saving rate of the
capitalists on the capacity utilisation rates. Tracing the change in the short-run steady-state loci
in a figure helps us explain their effects on the capacity utilisation rates.9
The u˙1 = 0 and u˙2 = 0 loci can be given by eqs. (16) and (17), respectively:
u1|u˙1=0 =
G1 +G2k + γ2ku2
1 − γ1
, (26)
u1|u˙2=0 =
sk(1 − m1)m2
z(1 − m2)(1 − sm1)u2. (27)
We plot the capacity utilisation rate of sector 2 on the x axis and that of sector 1 on the y axis.
Then, u˙1 = 0 is a straight line with a positive slope and intercept, and u˙2 = 0 is also a straight
line starting from the origin. When the short-run stability conditions are satisfied, the slope of
the u˙2 = 0 line is steeper than that of the u˙1 = 0 line, and we can obtain the positive steady-state
values for the capacity utilisation rates.
The original steady-state locus is presented with a dashed line and the steady state of the
system is shown by E∗ in Figures 1, 2, and 3. Compared with the original state, if the new steady
state shifts to the top right, then the capacity utilisation rates in both sectors increase, whereas if
it shifts to the bottom left, they decrease. Hence, a sector has a PLD (WLD) regime when a rise
in the profit share in one sector increases (decreases) its capacity utilisation rate. In addition, the
two-sector economy has a hybrid demand regime when the capacity utilisation rate in one sector
increases whereas that in the other sector decreases. This regime can be observed when the new
steady state shifts to the top left.
First, the impacts of a change in sector 1’s profit share on the u˙1 = 0 and u˙2 = 0 lines are
9Although these impacts can be obtained by directly differentiating eqs. (18) and (19) with respect to m1, m2, and
s, this yields complicated results. A graphical explanation instead allows us to understand the changes in demand
following these shocks.
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given as follows:
∂u1
∂m1
|u˙1=0 =
β1
1 − γ1
> 0, (28)
∂u1
∂m1
|u˙2=0 = −
sk(1 − s)m2
z(1 − m2)(1 − sm1)2 u2 < 0. (29)
Eq. (28) shows that the intercept of u˙1 = 0 line shifts upwards, whereas eq. (29) shows that the
slope of the u˙2 = 0 line flattens.
u1
u2
u˙2 = 0
u˙1 = 0
E∗
E∗1
u˙′2 = 0
u˙′1 = 0
Figure 1: The effect of a rise in sector 1’s profit share
Figure 1 illustrates this case, where the new steady-state lines are denoted by u˙′1 = 0 and
u˙′2 = 0 with solid ones. The PLD regime is established in both sectors because of the rise in
sector 1’s profit share. The steady state moves from E∗ to E∗1 by the following mechanisms.
First, a rise in sector 1’s profit share accelerates investment demand through the profit effect,
increasing the capacity utilisation rate in sector 1. Second, the rise in sector 1’s profit share
also increases demand for consumption goods through the relative price effect, raising sector 2’s
11
capacity utilisation rate. The positive and stable feedback between the capacity utilisation rates of
both sectors leads the economy to the new steady state E∗1, where the sectoral capacity utilisation
rates are higher than before.
Second, the impacts of a change in sector 2’s profit share on these lines are given as follows:
∂u1
∂m2
|u˙1=0 =
β2k
1 − γ1
> 0, (30)
∂u1
∂m2
|u˙2=0 =
sk(1 − m1)
z(1 − m2)2(1 − sm1)u2 > 0. (31)
The intercept of the u˙1 = 0 line shifts upwards, whereas the slope of the u˙2 = 0 line becomes
steeper. The former is driven by the profit effect on sector 2’s investment demand and the latter is
brought about by the negative effects of the relative price ratio and income redistribution. Figure
2 illustrates three possible scenarios due to a rise in sector 2’s profit share. Given a constant
upwards shift of the u˙1 = 0 line, the effects depend on the degree of the shifts of the u˙2 = 0 line.10
u1
u2
u˙2 = 0
u˙1 = 0
E∗
E∗1
u˙′2 = 0u˙′′′2 = 0u˙′′2 = 0
E∗3
E∗2
u˙′1 = 0
10The shift of the u˙1 = 0 line in Figure 2 is shown as constant to simply explain the underlining mechanisms in
each scenario. However, the degree of the shift of both the u˙1 = 0 and the u˙2 = 0 lines determines the three possible
scenarios.
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Figure 2: The effect of a rise in sector 2’s profit share
The first scenario is the shift to E∗1, where the capacity utilisation rates in both sectors increase.
Investment demand in sector 2 is stimulated by the rise in the profit share, inducing an upwards
shift of the u˙1 = 0 line. Meanwhile, demand for consumption goods decreases due to the shock,
rotating the u˙2 = 0 line anticlockwise. Because the reduction in sector 2’s capacity utilisation rate
is small in this scenario, the negative feedback on sector 1’s capacity utilisation rate is limited.
Sustained by the initially high rise in sector 1’s capacity utilisation rate, the capacity utilisation
rates in both sectors are higher than before. This scenario is observed when β2 and γ1 take high
values and the u˙1 = 0 line shifts greatly. In addition, when z takes a high value but s and m2 take
low ones, the anticlockwise rotation of the u˙2 = 0 line is marginal.
The second scenario is the shift to E∗2, where the capacity utilisation rates in both sectors
decrease. When the negative impact on demand for consumption goods is strong, the u˙2 = 0 line
greatly rotates anticlockwise (u˙′′2 = 0), largely decreasing the capacity utilisation rate in sector
2. It further decreases sector 2’s investment demand, reducing sector 1’s capacity utilisation rate.
Consequently, sector 1’s total income decreases, causing a vicious circle between the sectoral
capacity utilisation rates. The economy eventually reaches the new steady state E∗2, where the
capacity utilisation rates of both sectors are lower than before. This scenario is observed when
β2 and γ1 take low values as well as when z takes a low value but s and m2 take high ones. The
former conditions hardly shift the u˙1 = 0 line, whereas the latter conditions substantially rotate
the u˙2 = 0 line anticlockwise.
An interesting scenario is the shift to E∗3, where the capacity utilisation rate of sector 1 is
higher than before, whereas that of sector 2 is lower. As we have seen, a rise in sector 2’s
profit share initially raises the capacity utilisation rate of sector 1 but lowers that of sector 2. In
the feedback process, the fall in sector 2’s capacity utilisation rate negatively affects sector 1’s
capacity utilisation rate. However, when the anticlockwise rotation of the u˙2 = 0 line is moderate
(u˙′′′2 = 0), the negative impact on sector 1’s capacity utilisation rate is modest. Accordingly, the
initial rise in sector 1’s capacity utilisation rate is sustained in the short run, preventing a large
decrease in sector 2’s capacity utilisation rate as in the second scenario. This two-sector economy
realises a hybrid demand regime in which sectors 1 and 2 experience PLD and WLD regimes,
respectively. This scenario is more likely when the relevant parameters take moderate values, so
that the shifts of the u˙1 = 0 and u˙2 = 0 lines are also intermediate.
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Finally, the impact of a change in the saving rate on the u˙1 = 0 line is zero, whereas that on
the u˙2 = 0 line is
∂u1
∂s
|u˙2=0 =
k(1 − m1)m2
z(1 − m2)(1 − sm1)2 u2 > 0, (32)
which shows that the slope of the u˙2 = 0 line becomes steeper.
u1
u2
u˙2 = 0
u˙1 = 0
E∗
E∗1
u˙′2 = 0
Figure 3: The effect of a rise in the capitalists’ saving rate
Figure 3 illustrates the case in which the new steady-state line for sector 2 is given by u˙′2 = 0
with a solid one. Combined with the original u˙1 = 0 line being unaffected, the steady state moves
from E∗ to E∗1, where the capacity utilisation rates are lower than before. The so-called paradox
of thrift prevails in the short run. A rise in the saving rate of the capitalists simply means a
reduction in their consumption expenditure. Hence, it decreases sector 2’s capacity utilisation
rates and investment demand. Consequently, sector 1’s capacity utilisation rate is also negatively
affected.
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Table 1: Short run effects of a rise in profit share and saving rate
u∗1 u
∗
2 Changes in capacity utilisation rates and conditions
m1 + + Always PLD regime
m2
+ + (1) PLD regime, if β2, γ1, and z are large, or s and m2 is small
− − (2) WLD redime, if β2, γ1, and z are small, or s and m2 is large
+ − (3) Hybrid demand regime, if they are intermediate
s − − Paradox of thrift holds (demand-led)
Table 1 summarises the main results of the comparative statics analysis. A rise in sector
1’s profit share increases the rates of capacity utilisation, always establishing the PLD regime
in both sectors. Depending on the values of the relevant parameters, a rise in sector 2’s profit
share generates (1) the PLD regime in both sectors, (2) the WLD regime in both sectors, or (3)
the hybrid demand regime. Finally, a rise in the capitalists’ saving rate decreases the rates of
capacity utilisation and the paradox of thrift holds in both sectors. Further, we can easily confirm
that a rise in the parameters of investment demand (i.e. G1 and G2) also increases the rates of
capacity utilisation in both sectors, as eqs. (18) and (19) show. Thus, the short-run capacity
utilisation rates are demand- and distribution-led ones.
4 Analysis of the long-run dynamics
4.1 Dynamic system and steady state
In the long-run period, the investment realises new capital stock, whereas the capacity utilisation
rates continuously change according to the short-run steady state. Therefore, ˙K1 = I1 and ˙K2 = I2
are newly effective, and accordingly, we have to analyse the dynamics of the capital ratio k ≡ K2
K1
.
We extend the short-run model in two ways. First, we consider the Kaldorian effects of
technical change. The production technique in a sector is measured by its labour productivity
ai and the output–capital ratio ui. Both variables change due to capital accumulation, whereas
the output–capital ratio also varies according to the short-run steady state. Second, we allow for
an endogenous change in the nominal wage rate associated with the labour productivity growth
dynamics across industries. Because both wages and labour productivity simultaneously change,
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the unit cost ratio z ≡ w1a2
w2a1
varies over time.
First, we formalise the endogenous growth in labour productivity using Kaldor (1957)’s tech-
nical progress function. The labour productivity growth rate in each sector is given by
aˆ1 = θ10 + θ11g1, (33)
aˆ2 = θ20 + θ21g2, (34)
where gi is realised by eqs. (33) and (34), meaning that the technical change is embodied in
newly installed capital stock. According to Kaldor (1957), the labour productivity growth rate
principally depends on two factors (pp. 595–6). The first is the degree of ‘technical dynamism’,
which is the ability to invent, absorb, and introduce new production techniques, as summarised
by θi0 > 0. The second is the effect of capital accumulation, with the labour productivity growth
associated with the capital stock expansion changing in a cumulative manner. We present the
degree of this effect by θi1 > 0, which is conventionally called the Kaldor–Verdoon coefficient.
Second, following empirical evidence (Marquetti (2004); Mallick and Sousa (2017)), we
consider that higher productivity leads to higher wage growth.11 Nominal wages endogenously
change in the two sectors according to the differences in labour productivity growth. Then, the
growth rate of the nominal wage rate in each sector is
wˆ1 = (1 − χ1)aˆ1, (35)
wˆ2 = (1 − χ2)aˆ2. (36)
In this linkage, we suppose that the workers want to prevent their living standard or wage rate
from decreasing by claiming a certain proportion (1−χi) of the labour productivity gain. The de-
gree is exogenous but would be affected by, for example, the bargaining power of labour unions.
A rise in their bargaining power (i.e. a fall in χi) would realise a higher wage rate as a result
of higher productivity growth, and vice versa. The gap between the wage and labour produc-
tivity growth rates is reflected in the change in inflation. Therefore, the real wage rate changes
according to productivity growth.
11Marquetti (2004) shows a link between real wages and labour productivity in the long run in the U.S. economy;
here, technical change is basically a labour-saving and capital-using one, which is called Marx-based technical
change. Mallick and Sousa (2017) find that technology has a positive and significant relationship with workers’
wage rate in the United States and that the accumulation of knowledge capital also contributes to the endogenous
growth process.
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The dynamic system consists of the changes in the unit cost ratio and capital ratio, where
the capacity utilisation rates immediately accommodate the changes in these ratios along the
short-run steady state.12 Observing eqs. (33)–(36), the system is defined as follows:
z˙ = z(wˆ1 − aˆ1 − (wˆ2 − aˆ2))
= z{χ2[θ20 + θ21(G2 + γ2u∗2)] − χ1[θ10 + θ11(G1 + γ1u∗1)]}, (37)
˙k = k(g2 − g1)
= k{G2 + γ2u∗2 − (G1 + γ1u∗1)}, (38)
where u∗1 and u∗2 are the functions of the unit cost ratio and capital ratio determined in eqs. (18)
and (19).
The long-run steady state of the two-sector economy is given by (u∗1L, u∗2L, k∗L, z∗L), which all
satisfy u˙1 = u˙2 = ˙k = z˙ = 0. Excluding the non-trivial values, the long-run steady state is given
by the following equations:
u∗1L =
(θ20χ2 − θ10χ1) − G1(θ11χ1 − θ21χ2)
γ1(θ11χ1 − θ21χ2) , (39)
u∗2L =
(θ20χ2 − θ10χ1) − G2(θ11χ1 − θ21χ2)
γ2(θ11χ1 − θ21χ2) , (40)
k∗L =
(1 − γ1)(θ20χ2 − θ10χ1) − G1(θ11χ1 − θ21χ2)
γ1(θ20χ2 − θ10χ1) , (41)
z∗L =
(1 − m1)sm2
γ2(1 − m2)(1 − sm1)
((θ20χ2 − θ10χ1) − G2(θ11χ1 − θ21χ2)
(θ20χ2 − θ10χ1) − G1(θ11χ1 − θ21χ2)
)
×
((1 − γ1)(θ20χ2 − θ10χ1) − G1(θ11χ1 − θ21χ2)
θ20χ2 − θ10χ1
)
≡
(1 − m1)sm2u∗2Lk∗L
(1 − m2)(1 − sm1)u∗1L
. (42)
As we have all the endogenous variables, we can define the aggregate output growth rate
(g∗AL), profit share (m∗AL), capacity utilisation rate (u∗AL), and profit rate (r∗AL).
Under the fixed production function, the growth rate of output is the same as that of capital
stock. From eqs. (39), (40), and (11) or (12), the long-run economic growth rate is given by
g∗AL = g
∗
1L = g
∗
2L =
θ20χ2 − θ10χ1
θ11χ1 − θ21χ2
. (43)
Because the sectoral output growth rates are equalised at the steady state, the aggregate output
growth rate is also the same as the sectoral ones regardless of the weight of the aggregation.
12As the growth rates of wages and labour productivity endogenously change in each sector, the unit cost ratio
also varies. Unless this ratio becomes constant, demand for consumption goods keeps changing over time, and sector
2’s capacity utilisation rate diverges, as eq. (17) indicates.
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The aggregate profit share is given by the weighted average of the sectoral profit shares, which
is as follows:
m∗AL =
p1(r1K1 + r2K2)
p1X1 + p2X2
=
p∗Lu
∗
1Lm1 + k∗Lu∗2Lm2
p∗Lu
∗
1L + k∗Lu∗2L
=
m2
1 − s(m1 − m2) . (44)
The capitalists’ saving rate affects the unit cost ratio (eq. (42)) and relative price ratio.
Finally, the aggregate capacity utilisation rate is given by13
u∗AL =
p1X1 + p2X2
p1(K1 + K2) =
p∗Lu
∗
1L + k∗Lu∗2L
p∗L(1 + k∗L)
≡
1 − s(m1 − m2)
sm2
g∗AL. (45)
This shows that the aggregate capacity utilisation rate is proportional to the economic growth
rate.
Combining eqs. (44) and (45), the aggregate profit rate is
r∗AL = u
∗
ALm
∗
AL =
g∗AL
s
, (46)
which means that the Cambridge equation (Kaldor (1955-6); Pasinetti (1961); Marglin (1984)) is
exactly established at the macroeconomic level. By contrast, it follows from eqs. (39), (40), and
(43) that su∗iLmi = g∗iL is not always guaranteed at the sectoral level.
Having identified the existence of the long-run steady state, we impose the following assump-
tion so that the steady-state values are positive and economically meaningful:
Assumption 1.
(1 − γ1)(θ20χ2 − θ10χ1) > G1(θ11χ1 − θ21χ2) > 0, (47)
(θ20χ2 − θ10χ1) > G2(θ11χ1 − θ21χ2) > 0. (48)
The first condition ensures positive values for sector 1’s capacity utilisation rate (eq. (39))
and the capital ratio (eq. (41)). The second condition ensures the positive values for sector 2’s
capacity utilisation rate (eq. (40)). Accordingly, the unit cost ratio (eq. (42)) also takes a positive
value. Moreover, the aggregate output growth rate, capacity utilisation rate, and profit rate are all
positive.
13As different capital goods cannot be summed physically, we need to evaluate the value using their own prices.
To calculate the aggregate capacity utilisation rate in eq. (45), we evaluate the value of capital and goods using the
relative price ratio given by the steady state. By contrast, the aggregate output growth rate in eq. (43) is independent
of such a weight because the output growth rates of both sectors are always the same.
18
Although the comparative statics analysis below considers the impact of functional income
distribution on sectoral and macroeconomic performance, the patterns of the technical change as
well as the wage and labour productivity growth differentials are worth mentioning.
Substituting the long-run growth rate into eqs. (33) and (34), we obtain the steady-state labour
productivity growth rate in each sector:
aˆ∗1 =
(
θ11θ20 − θ10θ21
θ11χ1 − θ21χ2
)
χ2, (49)
aˆ∗2 =
(
θ11θ20 − θ10θ21
θ11χ1 − θ21χ2
)
χ1. (50)
The long-run labour productivity growth rate is either positive or negative depending on the rel-
ative magnitude of the technological parameters. If the ratio of the Verdoon coefficient to the
degree of technical dynamism is larger in sector 1 than in sector 2 (i.e. θ11/θ10 > θ21/θ20), the
labour productivity growth rate is positive. In the opposite case, it is negative. As the capac-
ity utilisation rate is constant in the long-run steady state, its rate of change is zero. Therefore,
the long-run patterns of technical change are Harrod natural or labour-saving/using technical
change (Villanueva and Jiang (2018); Foley et al. (2019)). In the former case, labour productivity
increases, whereas capital productivity remains constant over time. In the latter case, labour pro-
ductivity decreases, whereas capital productivity remains constant over time. Thus, the patterns
of technical change are endogenously determined in our model.14
Moreover, eqs. (33)–(36) lead to
aˆ∗1
aˆ∗2
=
χ2
χ1
, (51)
wˆ∗1
wˆ∗2
=
(1 − χ1)χ2
(1 − χ2)χ1 . (52)
14We call our model TKK because technical change is formalised from Kaldor’s idea. Therefore, the models
are similar in that the long-run productivity growth rate is determined by the technical progress function (Kaldor
(1957), p. 616). Nonetheless, there are differences between Kaldor’s model and the TKK. First, the output and
productivity growth rates are also determined by the wage productivity indexation in our TKK model. Second,
Kaldor assumes full employment (Kaldor (1957), pp. 593–5), whereas we do not and the employment rate is
endogenously determined by the difference between the output and labour productivity growth rates. Third, the price
in relation to wages and the profit share accommodate the gap between saving and investment under full employment
(Kaldor (1957), pp.606-8), whereas in our model wages and prices are associated with labour productivity growth
and the profit share is determined by the mark-up. The third and fourth points come from the Kaleckian ideas built
into the TKK model.
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Interestingly, endogenous technical change and the associated wage dynamics explain the per-
sistent disparity in the wage and productivity growth rates between the two sectors. The sectoral
productivity and nominal wage growth rates never equate unless by chance (i.e. χ1 = χ2). For
instance, a lower χi brings about relatively high growth in productivity and nominal wages in
that sector. Given the other sector’s unit labour cost remains constant, if there is a rise in wage
growth in one sector because of a lower χi, a rise in labour productivity growth (and a change in
the capacity utilisation rate) in that sector is required to keep the unit cost ratio constant.
4.2 Stability analysis
The previous section identified the existence of the long-run steady state. This section reveals
its stability conditions. Let J∗L be the Jacobian matrix for eqs. (37) and (38); then, its non-zero
elements are given as follows:
jL11 ≡
∂z˙
∂z
= z∗L
(
χ2θ21γ2
∂u∗2
∂z
− χ1θ11γ1
∂u∗1
∂z
)
, (53)
jL12 ≡
∂z˙
∂k = z
∗
L
(
χ2θ21γ2
∂u∗2
∂k − χ1θ11γ1
∂u∗1
∂k
)
, (54)
jL21 ≡
∂˙k
∂z
= k∗L
(
γ2
∂u∗2
∂z
− γ1
∂u∗1
∂z
)
, (55)
jL22 ≡
∂˙k
∂k = k
∗
L
(
γ2
∂u∗2
∂k − γ1
∂u∗1
∂k
)
, (56)
where all the elements are evaluated at the long-run steady state. The sign of the impact of a
change in the capital ratio and unit labour cost on the capacity utilisation rates plays an important
role in local stability. Their signs are as follows:
∂u∗1
∂z
=
Λγ2
Θ2
> 0, (57)
∂u∗2
∂z
=
Λ(1 − γ1)
k∗LΘ2
> 0, (58)
∂u∗1
∂k =
s(1 − m1)m2G2
Θ
> 0, (59)
∂u∗2
∂k = −
(1 − sm1)(1 − m2)G1z∗L
k∗2L Θ
< 0, (60)
where
Θ ≡ sm2(1 − γ1)(1 − m1) − γ2(1 − m2)(1 − sm1)z∗L > 0, (61)
Λ ≡ s(1 − m1)(1 − sm1)(1 − m2)m2(G1 +G2k∗L) > 0. (62)
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We have Θ > 0 because the long-run steady state is realised on the basis of the short-run steady
state. Λ > 0 is also true because the profit share and the saving rate of the capitalists are princi-
pally between zero and unity.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for the stability of the long-run steady state are
Tr J∗L = jL11 + jL22 < 0 and det J∗L = jL11 jL22 − jL12 jL21 > 0. The trace of the Jacobian matrix
J∗L can be developed as follows:
Tr J∗L = z∗L
(
χ2θ21γ2
∂u∗2
∂z
− χ1θ11γ1
∂u∗1
∂z
)
︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸
jL11=?
+ k∗L
(
γ2
∂u∗2
∂k − γ1
∂u∗1
∂k
)
︸                   ︷︷                   ︸
jL22=−
< 0, (63)
where the sign in the second term is negative from eqs. (59) and (60). A negative jL11 is sufficient
for the sign of the trace to be negative. Substituting eqs. (57) and (58), we can obtain
jL11 = −
z∗LΛγ2
k∗LΘ2
(
θ11χ1 − θ21χ2
θ20χ2 − θ10χ1
) [(1 − γ1)(θ20χ2 − θ10χ1) − G1θ11χ1] . (64)
A negative value of jL11 is obtained if the following conditions are satisfied:
(1 − γ1)(θ20χ2 − θ10χ1) − G1θ11χ1 > 0, (65)
which is a stronger condition than eq. (47) in Assumption 1.15 If this holds, the sign of jL11 is
negative, and accordingly, the sign of the trace is negative. Economically, this means that a rise
in the unit cost ratio reduces the unit labour cost in sector 1 more than in sector 2. Thus, both the
unit cost ratio and the capital ratio have negative self-feedback dynamics.
Meanwhile, the determinant of the Jacobian matrix is developed as follows:
det J∗L = k∗Lz∗Lγ1γ2(θ21χ2 − θ11χ1)
(
∂u∗2
∂k
∂u∗1
∂z
−
∂u∗1
∂k
∂u∗2
∂z
)
︸                    ︷︷                    ︸
−
, (66)
where the sign in the second parentheses is determined by eqs. (57)–(60). Therefore, for this to
be positive, we need
θ11χ1 > θ21χ2, (67)
which is naturally satisfied under Assumption 1. This inequality means that the chain effect of a
change in the capital accumulation rate on the change in the unit labour cost is stronger in sector
1 than in sector 2.
15Assumption 1 does not ensure this condition. To be more precise, eq. (65) is a sufficient condition for eq. (47)
but not a necessary one.
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The long-run steady state is locally and asymptotically stable if eqs. (65) and (67) hold.
Since they are partially independent of Assumption 1, it is important to precisely specify the
range within which the stabilisation conditions hold. These are summarised in the following
simultaneous inequalities:
θ11 <
(1 − γ1)(θ20χ2 − θ10χ1)
G1χ1
, (68)
θ11 >
χ2
χ1
θ21. (69)
Eq. (68) represents the negative trace of the Jacobian matrix, whereas eq. (69) ensures a positive
determinant. Based on these, we have the following proposition on the stability of the long-run
steady state.
Proposition 2. Assume that the other parameters are constant under Assumption 1. (i) Given
a constant value of θ11, the long-run steady state is locally asymptotically stable as the value of
θ21 is low, whereas it is unstable as the value of θ21 is high. (ii) Given a constant value of θ21,
the long-run steady state is locally asymptotically stable as the value of θ11 is moderate, ranging
from χ2
χ1
θ21 < θ11 <
(1 − γ1)(θ20χ2 − θ10χ1)
G1χ1
.
A graphical representation helps explain the properties of the long-run stability conditions.
Taking θ21 and θ11 on the x and y axes, respectively, Figures 4 (case 1) and 5 (case 2) distinguish
the stable and unstable areas. The stable area is drawn in the shadow formed by eqs. (68) and
(69) and the unstable area is in plain shading including the solid lines themselves. Assumption 1,
which guarantees positive steady-state values, is effective in the areas between the parallel solid
lines based on eqs. (68) and (47) or (48). Depending on the values of γ1, G1, and G2, the height
of the intercept for eqs. (47) and (48) differs. Figure 4 (case 1) shows that the intercept for eq.
(47) is higher, whereas Figure 5 (case 1) shows that the intercept for eq. (48) is higher, where the
lower intercept is shown as the dashed line.16
16Precisely, the difference between the two intercepts is
(θ20χ2 − θ10χ1)
G2χ1
−
(1 − γ1)(θ20χ2 − θ10χ1)
G1χ1
=
(θ20χ2 − θ10χ1)
χ1G1G2
[G1 − (1 − γ1)G2],
meaning that as G2 is smaller and γ1 and G1 are larger, the intercept for eq. (48) is more likely to be higher than that
for eq. (47). When γ1 and G1 are large, the lines for eqs. (47) and (68) shift downwards, narrowing the stable areas
in the figures.
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θ11
θ21
Eq.(69): θ11 = χ2χ1 θ21
Eq.(68): θ11 = (1−γ1)(θ20χ2−θ10χ1)G1χ1
Eq.(47): θ11 = (1−γ1)(θ20χ2−θ10χ1)G1χ1 +
χ2
χ1
θ21
Eq.(48): θ11 = θ20χ2−θ10χ1G2χ1 +
χ2
χ1
θ21
Figure 4: Stable (shadowed) and unstable (plain) areas: case 1
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θ11
θ21
Eq.(69): θ11 = χ2χ1 θ21
Eq.(68): θ11 = (1−γ1)(θ20χ2−θ10χ1)G1χ1
Eq.(47): θ11 = (1−γ1)(θ20χ2−θ10χ1)G1χ1 +
χ2
χ1
θ21
Eq.(48): θ11 = θ20χ2−θ10χ1G2χ1 +
χ2
χ1
θ21
Figure 5: Stable (shadowed) and unstable (plain) areas: case 2
Proposition 2 suggests that given the other parameters, the Verdoon coefficients θ11 and θ21
must take a certain value to realise the stability of the long-run steady state. For instance, we
can illustrate a destabilising process when θ21 takes a high value given a small θ11, rejecting that
det J∗L has to be positive. In this case, once a positive shock to z occurs in an original steady
state, it lowers the capital ratio (eq. (55)) by largely stimulating sector 1’s capacity utilisation
rate. The lower capital ratio raises the unit cost ratio markedly (eq. (54)). Regardless of the unit
cost ratio’s self-feedback, when these interactions are sufficiently strong, the two-sector economy
experiences saddle-path unstable dynamics.
We can conclude from this result that the long-run stability conditions are mostly determined
by technical change and the associated productivity and wage growth parameters. By contrast,
only γ1 and G1 concern these conditions from the demand side.
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4.3 Comparative statics analysis
This section considers the impacts of income distribution, the saving rate, and technical changes
on the sectoral capacity utilisation rates and profit rates based on eqs. (39) and (40) in the long-
run steady state. We also compare their impacts on the aggregate output growth rate (eq. (43)),
profit share (eq. (44)), capacity utilisation rate (eq. (45)), and profit rate (eq. (46)) to shed light
on how macroeconomic performance differs from industrial performance.17 Table 2 shows the
results and the Appendix details the calculation.
Table 2: Long run effects of a rise in relevant parameters
u∗1L u
∗
2L r
∗
1L r
∗
2L u
∗
AL m
∗
AL g
∗
AL r
∗
AL
m1 − 0 ± 0 − + 0 0
m2 0 − 0 ± − + 0 0
s 0 0 0 0 − ± 0 −
θ10, θ11 − − − − − 0 − −
θ20, θ21 + + + + + 0 + +
A positive shock to sector 1’s profit share (the first row) has a negative impact on its capacity
utilisation rate without affecting the other sector’s performance. In other words, sector 1 presents
a WLD regime in response to this shock. The rise in sector 1’s profit share either raises or lowers
its profit rate depending on the relative magnitude of such a rise and the fall in the capacity
utilisation rate. It also increases the aggregate profit share, and the aggregate capacity utilisation
rate follows a WLD expansion. However, sector 1’s profit share has no effect on the long-run
economic growth rate or profit rate at the aggregate level.18
17Although we could also analyse the impacts on the capital ratio and unit cost ratio, we do not consider these
variables because they do not directly represent the sectoral or macroeconomic activity levels.
18The underlying mechanisms for these outcomes are as follows. The long-run output growth rate is determined
exclusively by the parameters that affect the unit labour cost (eq. (43)). Then, the capacity utilisation rate of each
sector is determined to accommodate these conditions (eqs. (39) and (40)) as u∗iL = (g∗AL − Gi)/γi, which only
includes the income distribution share of that sector. Therefore, a rise in the profit share of each sector only affects
that sector.
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A rise in sector 2’s profit share (the second row) has no impact on the capacity utilisation
rate of sector 1. By contrast, that of sector 2 presents a WLD regime in response to this shock.
Sector 2’s profit rate either rises or falls depending on the relative magnitude of such a rise and
subsequent fall in the capacity utilisation rate. It also increases the aggregate profit share, and the
aggregate capacity utilisation rate follows a WLD expansion. However, the output growth rate is
also independent of sector 2’s profit share. It has no effect on the long-run aggregate profit rate
either.
A change in the saving rate (the third row) does not affect the capacity utilisation and profit
rates. In other words, the paradox of thrift does not occur at the sectoral level. Meanwhile, the
aggregate capacity utilisation rate and profit rate decrease, whereas the change in the profit share
depends on the magnitude of the relationship between the sectoral profit shares. When m1 > m2,
the aggregate profit share rises, and the aggregate capacity utilisation rate moves like a WLD
regime. In the opposite case, the aggregate profit share falls, and it moves like a PLD regime.
This co-movement does not reflect the change in the sectoral profit share or capacity utilisation
rate, but is induced by the saving rate and the associated change in nominal values.19
Importantly, the economic growth rates are determined by the supply-side parameters that
affect the unit cost ratio (the fourth and fifth rows). If the rate of exogenous labour productivity
growth in sector 2 (i.e. a rise in θ20) accelerates compared with that in sector 1 (θ10), the long-run
economic growth rate rises. Although we do not report the details to save space, when the wage
productivity growth indexation weakens in sector 2 (i.e. a rise in χ2), the economic growth rate
also rises. When this happens in sector 1 (i.e. a rise in χ1), the economic growth rate falls.
Simultaneously, there is a trade-off between a high economic growth rate and the stability
of the steady state. The long-run economic growth rate accelerates, as the gap between sector 2
and sector 1 is smaller for the chain effect of capital accumulation on the unit labour cost (i.e.
θ11χ1 − θ21χ2 is positive but small in eq. (43)). By contrast, this chain effect must be stronger
in sector 1 than in sector 2 for long-run steady-state local stability (i.e. θ11χ1 − θ21χ2 is positive
19These effects arise through the changes in nominal value weights to calculate the aggregate variables. The
sectoral capacity utilisation rates and capital ratio are independent of the saving rate (eqs. (39)–(41)), but they raise
the unit cost ratio and relative price ratio (eq. (42)). Decreasing the weight of sector 2’s share, the rise in the relative
price ratio reduces the aggregate capacity utilisation rate in eq. (45). Meanwhile, it equally increases and decreases
the weight of the shares of sectors 1 and 2 in eq. (44), respectively. Depending on the magnitude of the relationship
between the two sectors’ profit shares, the aggregate profit share rises or falls.
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and large in eq. (67)). If this gap is large, it contributes to local stability, whereas the long-run
economic growth rate declines.
Our model offers implications for long-run economic performance that differ from those of
existing Kaleckian two-sector models. Previous two-sector Kaleckian models have shown that
a rise in the profit share or saving rate has a positive or negative effect on the economic growth
rate, even in the long run (Beqiraj et al. (2019); Fujita (2019a,b); Nishi (2020)). By contrast, the
presented TKK model reveals that income distribution has no impact on economic growth and
that even the paradox of thrift does not hold.20 Moreover, although a rise in the profit share of one
sector accompanies a rise in the profit share and a fall in capacity utilisation rates at the aggregate
level, it does not change the capacity utilisation rate of the other sector. Thus, macroeconomic
performance does not necessarily reflect uniform changes in industrial performance.
In summary, the effect of income distribution and effective demand on economic growth in the
present model is limited compared with in the conventional model. Unlike previous studies, the
driving force for long-run economic growth is the parameters that regulate technical change and
the associated wage dynamics. In brief, our model clearly shows that the short-run steady state
has a Kaleckian character, whereas the long-run economic growth mechanism has a Kaldorian
character.
5 Conclusion
We built a TKK model in which investment goods and consumer goods are produced, and anal-
ysed the short- and long-run effects of income distribution, technical change, and economic
growth in terms of sectoral and macroeconomic performance. The main results can be sum-
marised in the following eight points.
The stability analysis for the short-run steady state shows that (1) it is stable when the Key-
nesian stability condition for sector 1’s quantity adjustment is effective and the positive feedback
between the two sectors’ capacity utilisation rates is weak. Our comparative statics analysis
20Dume´nil and Le´vy (1999) present a two-good model, showing that the post-Keynesian implication holds in the
short run, whereas the classical one holds in the long run. Their model also undermines Kaleckian implications such
as the paradoxes of thrift and cost; however, its underlying mechanism is the role of monetary policy and its impact
on capital accumulation. Our TKK model is different from theirs in that even if we do not suppose monetary policy,
the long-run economy behaves unlike Kaleckian (or post-Keynesian) implications.
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shows that the capacity utilisation rates of the two sectors (2) increase following a rise in sec-
tor 1’s profit share; (3) decrease following a rise in the capitalists’ saving rate; and (4) not only
increase or decrease simultaneously, but also respond differently to a rise in sector 2’s profit
share. In contrast to aggregate Kaleckian models, result (4) is novel, confirming that a two-sector
economy may experience a hybrid demand expansion, where sector 1 expands in a PLD manner,
whereas sector 2 stagnates in a WLD manner. Thus, the benefit of changing sector 2’s profit
share is conflictive between the two sectors in the short run.
The stability analysis for the long-run steady state shows that (5) the conditions are mostly
determined by the supply-side (i.e. technical change and the associated productivity and wage
growth) parameters. Our comparative statics analysis shows that (6) a rise in the profit share of
each sector lowers that sector’s capacity utilisation rate and consequently, the aggregate capacity
utilisation rate; (7) a rise in the capitalists’ saving rate does not change the sectoral capacity util-
isation rates or the aggregate output growth rate, but decreases the aggregate capacity utilisation
rate and profit rate; and (8) a rise in the technological parameters in sector 2 raises the capacity
utilisation and output growth rates at both the sectoral and the macroeconomic levels, whereas
such a rise in sector 1 restrains these rates.
Thus, the short-run steady state is characterised as Kaleckian, where demand and income dis-
tribution matter, whereas long-run economic growth is more Kaldorian, where technical change
matters. As the determinants of the long-run demand regime and economic growth rate are dif-
ferent from those not only in the short run but also in previous two-sector Kaleckian models, they
should also be highlighted.
In our TKK model, the demand and distribution parameters have limited effects, whereas
the supply-side parameters have broader effects on sectoral and aggregate macroeconomic per-
formance and its stability. As result (6) shows, the capacity utilisation rates change in a WLD
manner in response to a change in income distribution in that sector only. Thus, the benefit of the
change in income distribution is not uniform between the two sectors in the long run. Surpris-
ingly, from a Kaleckian standpoint, result (7) means that the paradox of thrift does not hold in the
long run either. Result (8) reveals that the economic growth rates of both sectors are completely
determined by technical change and the associated productivity and wage growth. Moreover,
there is a persistent disparity in the wage and productivity growth rates between the two sectors.
In this process, as the chain effects of a change in the capital accumulation rate on the change in
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the unit labour cost work more strongly in sector 2 than in sector 1, the long-run economic growth
rate rises. However, in light of result (5), this effect is more likely to violate the long-run stability
condition simultaneously. Hence, we find the important implication that a two-sector economy
faces a trade-off between a high economic growth rate and the local stability of the steady state.
Appendix
This Appendix describes the calculation of the comparative statics in the long run presented in
Table 2, showing that the effects of the relevant parameters are not zero. The impacts of the
changes in the profit distribution shares of sectors 1 (the first row) on the long-run steady-state
values are as follows:
∂u∗1L
∂m1
= −
β1
γ1
< 0
∂r∗1L
∂m1
=
(θ20χ2 − θ10χ1) − (G1 + β1m1)(θ11χ1 − θ21χ2)
γ1(θ11χ1 − θ21χ2) ≶ 0
∂u∗AL
∂m1
= −
(θ20χ2 − θ10χ1)
m1(θ11χ1 − θ20χ2) < 0
∂m∗AL
∂m1
=
sm2
(1 − sm1 + sm2)2 > 0
The effect on sector 1’s profit rate is negative when the parameters G1 + β1m1 are large, whereas
it is positive when they are small.
The impacts of changes in the profit distribution shares of sector 2 (the second row) on the
long-run steady-state values are as follows:
∂u∗2L
∂m2
= −
β2
γ2
< 0
∂r∗2L
∂m2
=
(θ20χ2 − θ10χ1) − (G2 + β2m2)(θ11χ1 − θ21χ2)
γ2(θ11χ1 − θ21χ2) ≶ 0
∂u∗AL
∂m2
= −
(1 − sm1)(θ20χ2 − θ10χ1)
sm22(θ11χ1 − θ20χ2)
< 0
∂m∗AL
∂m2
=
1 − sm1
(1 − sm1 + sm2)2 > 0
The effect on sector 2’s profit rate is negative when the parameters G2 + β2m2 are large, whereas
it is positive when they are small.
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The impacts of changes in the capitalists’ saving rate (the third row) on the long-run steady-
state values are as follows:
∂u∗AL
∂m2
= −
(θ20χ2 − θ10χ1)
s2m2(θ11χ1 − θ20χ2) < 0
∂m∗AL
∂m2
=
(m1 − m2)m2
(1 − sm1 + sm2)2 ≶ 0
∂r∗AL
∂m2
= −
(θ20χ2 − θ10χ1)
(θ11χ1 − θ21χ2) < 0
Hence, when m1 < m2, the aggregate profit share falls in response to a rise in the saving rate,
whereas it rises when m1 > m2.
The impacts of changes in the technical progress function of sector 1 (the fourth row) on the
long-run steady-state values are as follows (the results are shown in a compact manner to save
space):
∂u∗1L
∂θ10
=
1
g∗AL
·
∂u∗1L
∂θ11
= −
χ1
γ1(θ11χ1 − θ20χ2) < 0
∂u∗2L
∂θ10
=
1
g∗AL
·
∂u∗2L
∂θ11
= −
χ1
γ2(θ11χ1 − θ20χ2) < 0
∂r∗1L
∂θ10
=
1
g∗AL
·
∂r∗1L
∂θ11
= −
m1χ1
γ1(θ11χ1 − θ20χ2) < 0
∂r∗2L
∂θ10
=
1
g∗AL
·
∂r∗2L
∂θ11
= −
m2χ1
γ2(θ11χ1 − θ20χ2) < 0
∂u∗AL
∂θ10
=
1
g∗AL
·
∂u∗AL
∂θ11
= −
χ1(1 − s1m1 + sm2)
sm2(θ11χ1 − θ20χ2) < 0
∂g∗AL
∂θ10
=
1
g∗AL
·
∂g∗AL
∂θ11
= −
χ1
(θ11χ1 − θ20χ2) < 0
∂r∗AL
∂θ10
=
1
g∗AL
·
∂r∗AL
∂θ11
= −
χ1
s(θ11χ1 − θ20χ2) < 0
The impacts of changes in the technical progress function of sector 2 (the fifth row) on the
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long-run steady-state values are as follows:
∂u∗1L
∂θ20
=
1
g∗AL
·
∂u∗1L
∂θ21
=
χ2
γ1(θ11χ1 − θ20χ2) > 0
∂u∗2L
∂θ20
=
1
g∗AL
·
∂u∗2L
∂θ21
=
χ2
γ2(θ11χ1 − θ20χ2) > 0
∂r∗1L
∂θ20
=
1
g∗AL
·
∂r∗1L
∂θ21
=
m1χ2
γ1(θ11χ1 − θ20χ2) > 0
∂r∗2L
∂θ20
=
1
g∗AL
·
∂r∗2L
∂θ21
=
m2χ2
γ2(θ11χ1 − θ20χ2) > 0
∂u∗AL
∂θ20
=
1
g∗AL
·
∂u∗AL
∂θ21
=
χ2(1 − s1m1 + sm2)
sm2(θ11χ1 − θ20χ2) > 0
∂g∗AL
∂θ20
=
1
g∗AL
·
∂g∗AL
∂θ21
=
χ2
(θ11χ1 − θ20χ2) > 0
∂r∗AL
∂θ20
=
1
g∗AL
·
∂r∗AL
∂θ21
=
χ2
s(θ11χ1 − θ20χ2) > 0
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